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For a Revival of Feminist Consciousness Raising: Horizontal Transformation of 
Epistemologies and Transgression of Neoliberal TimeSpace 
Abstract 
This paper looks back on the methodology and experience of feminist consciousness-raising 
(CR) in the 1970s, in relation to the current re-emergence of feminism. It constructs an 
argument that a new wave of CR is desirable so as to construct new forms of feminist 
pedagogy and activism. The paper will argue that contemporary feminism in the UK and US 
would benefit from this kind of methodology, through which a standpoint is constructed. The 
core of the paper is an analysis of how CR works as an affective and social process. Drawing 
on academic studies and participant accounts, the paper reconstructs the mechanisms through 
which participants' subjectivities and narratives are expressed and transformed. It suggests 
that these mechanisms express different non-homogeneous temporalities. The paper invites 
feminist pedagogy to get back to the base level of experience and unfold new theories and 
strategies to address the current context. 
Keywords: Feminism, pedagogy, consciousness-raising, temporality. 
 
Introduction 
The re-emergence of feminism is a notable aspect of contemporary social movements, 
exemplified in the UK and US by practices including Slutwalk, Internet campaigns such as “I 
Need Feminism Because” and the growth of significant feminist subcultures on Twitter, 
Facebook and Tumblr. This re-emergence represents a welcome recomposition of 
oppositional politics in a context where social movements in general are under siege and in 
decline. However, it has been argued (e.g. Cook and Hasmath 2014; Renold and Ringrose 
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2012) that something is lacking in the discursive construction of many current Anglo-
American feminist movements, which are often individualised and appeal to hegemonic 
structures and identities. We contend that this is because they lack means of collective 
grassroots knowledge-formation about the experiences of women. This lack, which has some 
international exceptions (c.f. Casas, 2006 on Precarias a la Deriva), affects those movements 
most visibly portrayed in mainstream and social media, and is reflected in many 
contemporary academic approaches. This limit arguably has the potential to impede the 
ability of feminists and other radicals to break with the dominant assumptions of 
neoliberalism.  
 
In this paper, we argue that the lack of grassroots knowledge-production is problematic for 
social movements, for academic feminism, and for radical politics and theory more broadly. 
The reason this issue is so important is the existence of two traps: First, the glorification or 
acceptance of existing common sense and thus of systemic discursive power; second, of 
positing a vanguardist form of knowledge in which a leading group represents an entire social 
sector based on its own, self-formulated theoretical perspective. To elaborate, the first trap 
refers to the replication of ‘common sense’ in the Gramscian sense of a dominant, taken-for-
granted immanent philosophy embedded in and reproducing the existing social structure. 
Following Gramsci we take ‘common sense’ to be a major underpinning of social conformity, 
but also an inconsistent assemblage containing emancipatory residues of 'good sense' 
(Gramsci 1971:323-34). The second trap, vanguardism, refers to cases whereby the activist, 
leader, or scholar claims a right to know, from outside or above, a particular position (Motta, 
2011). Our framework is thus inspired by recent literatures on post-representational and anti-
oppressive epistemologies, which argue that practices of representing others or claiming 
privileged oversight ought to be avoided in favour of radically open approaches in which 
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theoretical knowledge is produced non-hierarchically through direct experiences with others 
as part of prefigurative non-hierarchical political practices (Starodub 2015; Luchies 2015). 
 
This dual trap is manifested in many different movements. In feminist movements it is 
expressed by, on the one hand, the mistaking of neoliberal truisms for feminism, e.g. spatial 
regulation, personal responsibility, conventional 'success', and on the other, the construction 
of feminist subjectivities in which claims to consciousness are premised on structural 
knowledge and/or individual experience, and which therefore risks vanguardism. This is not 
to deny the vital necessity of feminism or its contemporary expressions. However, we suggest 
that the feminist movement needs to deepen its grassroots epistemic base so as to flourish. 
The earlier wave of consciousness-raising took place during the Fordist period, which, 
through a combination of labour security and social welfare citizenship, ensured a degree of 
uniformity in experiences of oppression (Nadasen 2012). Transformations in the present 
neoliberal period, including ‘deregulation, privatization, securitization, and the dismantling of 
the welfare state’ (Nadasen 2012), have led to more fragmented experiences, such as 
accentuating race and class divides. Thus, constructing the possibility for identifying and 
resisting new forms of oppression today requires conditions of collective knowledge 
production in which different perspectives can be weaved together without privileging one or 
other voice in some form of polyphonic dialogue (Bakhtin 1984). 
 
The core argument of the paper is that feminism (and by extension, all forms of radical 
theory) requires grassroots knowledge-production to provide a non-vanguardist 
epistemological basis for knowledge-production which also avoids reproducing 'common 
sense'. We theorise feminist consciousness raising (henceforth CR) as a historical and 
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potential future example of such a practice, and show how it enables everyday social actors 
and social movements to produce varied forms of social knowledge, including transformed 
consciousness and structural awareness. Feminism is not a singular movement, and many 
different actors use the label 'feminist' for diverse projects. In this paper, we treat feminism as 
a movement for the liberation of women from social-systemic domination (whether this is 
conceived as domination by men, patriarchy, or capitalism). Feminism thus requires claims 
about women's experiences, perspectives, or interests, to ground the view that women as a 
group are oppressed in systematic ways. We maintain that claims of this type are possible, but 
that making such claims from a vanguard position is inherently problematic. Feminism thus 
requires a process of grassroots knowledge-production involving a diverse range of different 
women (as well as or instead of academic, media, or political figures) so as to construct a 
viable sense of a commonly oppressed group which is not simply a projection or construct of 
a particular author or speaker. 
 
The paper begins by arguing that there is a fundamental problem in radical epistemology, 
which derives from two contending imperatives. On the one hand, radical theory, including 
feminism, is almost by definition opposed to the dominant common sense constructed and 
articulated by the dominant social system (Robinson, 2005). An effective political radicalism 
must necessarily challenge existing attachments, transform affect, release or restructure desire 
and 'decolonise' existing insertions in dominant discourses (Firth, 2013). On the other hand, 
radicals have become increasingly aware of the need to avoid a vanguardist intellectual 
position which carries dangers of vertical political power, manipulative politics, and the 
silencing of the very people the movement aims to liberate (Motta, 2011). We would argue 
that certain practices of the 1960s/70s wave and of recent horizontalist movements – such as 
the more radical versions of critical pedagogy, institutional analysis, theatre of the oppressed, 
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autonomist militant inquiry, horizontal knowledge-sharing such as skill-shares, and, centrally 
for this article, the feminist practice of consciousness-raising (CR), provide a solution to this 
problem, offering ways to reformulate knowledges at once transformative and non-
vanguardist. Such processes of collective knowledge-production have largely gone missing in 
the translation of second-wave feminist practices into academic, mediatised, and virtual 
spaces today. This is reflective of a wider tendency towards disconnection and alienation of 
social movement studies in the academy from social movement practices (Bevington and 
Dixon 2005). A revival is needed to overcome the forms of paralysis arising from the 
neoliberal context and the dominance of mediated, instrumental forms of communication, and 
to ground feminist theory in the politically-informed experience and interests of those it aims 
to liberate. As Bartky (1977: 23) argues, 'the oppression of women is universal, feminist 
consciousness is not'. In order to contribute to such a revival, this paper attempts to theorise 
and reconstruct the affective process of CR with reference to theories of temporality, in order 
to link CR as a historical practice of grassroots knowledge-production with broader ideas of 
social change relevant to the current context.  
 
This question is tied-up with theories of temporality in various ways. We have argued in 
previous articles (Firth and Robinson 2012 & 2014) that whilst particular experiences of time, 
for example as linear, progressive and sequential are often viewed as essential features of any 
temporal ontology, such experiences are actually historically and culturally contingent, and it 
is possible to imagine and create alternatives, through theories and practices.  Experiences of 
time are necessarily connected to experiences of continuity and change, causality and/or free 
will, and the realm of the possible and desirable. Transformation is limited by the dominant 
mode of homogeneous empty time (Benjamin, 1970), and empowered by prefigurative 
temporalities (Firth and Robinson, 2012). Time has suffered particular mutations in neoliberal 
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capitalism, which are dissimilar to those of the Fordist structure combated by earlier 
movements. A current spatio-temporal closure – an inability to imagine beyond present 
constructions of space and time - afflicts oppressed subjects in general. This includes women, 
and has been characterised as 'present shock' (Rushkoff, 2013), a type of temporal 
compression whereby time becomes an eternal present. The discursive construction of 
causation is increasingly reduced to neoliberal doctrines of personal responsibility and 
aggregate forms of data-driven social correlation. Thus the ways in which we understand the 
causes of current suffering and struggle are individualised, and it becomes difficult to 
produce knowledge and communicate the impact of oppressive structures on our lives using 
existing terminology and concepts.  This process of temporal closure increasingly makes the 
present system feel like the only possibility. An effective feminist movement needs to break 
out of the type of temporality represented by 'present shock', yet prevalent forms of 
subjectivity and communication render this difficult. Recovery of grassroots knowledge-
production is vital to overcoming this blockage. In line with our earlier work (Firth and 
Robinson 2012, 2014), we conceive the process of transformation as fundamentally temporal. 
This is congruent with feminist approaches to time (Kristeva, 1981; Amoros, 2004), although 
we also rely on male postcolonial and poststructural theorists of time including Wallerstein, 
Deleuze and Virilio. We are not only interested in the relationship between past and present 
varieties of consciousness-raising or in the question of learning from the past, although the 
ability to adapt established practices to new contexts is arguably crucial to any revival of CR 
today. What we are more specifically interested in is thinking through the ways in which CR 
as a form of grassroots knowledge production enables critique of ‘common sense’ without the 
need for a vanguard. We do this by theorising the ways in which CR alters experiences of 
space and time by constructing a form of knowledge rooted in experiences but distinct from 
common sense. The paper is thus largely theoretical but has practical implications for feminist 
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pedagogy and political action. In the following sections, we introduce CR as a process and consider 
some of the problems with feminist knowledge production today that necessitate the re-introduction of 
a process like CR. We then disaggregate the process into various aspects: The structuring role of the 
hypothesis; constructing a safe space; the emotional weaving of narratives; affective transformation 
and personal durée and the transformative moment of ‘the click’. We theorise each of these aspects in 
through the ways in which they construct alternative temporalities in order to elaborate the ways in 
which they transform ‘common sense’ through grassroots and non-vanguardist forms of knowledge 
production. 
 
Consciousness-raising groups 
Consciousness Raising (CR) groups were central to the second-wave feminist movement of 
the 1970s, with the first groups emerging in the late 1960s. They have been interpreted as a 
pedagogical tool for social transformation (Henderson-King and Stewart, 1999). CR groups 
were voluntary, usually women-only, regular discussion groups focused on recounting and 
interpreting the experiences of participants, generally by presenting members' experiences 
around a defined topic, then drawing out similarities and structural relations to the oppression 
of women. Initiated by the New York Radical Feminists and the Redstockings Collective, 
they were quickly adopted and adapted by other groups in the US and worldwide (Rosenthal, 
1984:309), encompassing hundreds of thousands of women at their height. The group format 
typically consisted of a round of personal experiences and reflections on the week's theme, 
followed by an integrative session in which the group sought to combine their accounts into a 
structural picture. They occurred in a political context in which women were frustrated with 
traditional roles, but unable to articulate their frustrations in social lives where contact among 
women was usually mediated by men. The groups were not intended primarily as self-help, 
therapy, or 'venting', but rather, as a form of political transformation (Shreve, 1989:218-19). 
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The goal was to analyse a common situation of oppression to provide a basis for a 
programme of liberation (Redstockings, cited Shreve, 1989:11). CR has been termed 'the 
major technique of analysis, structure of organization, method of practice, and theory of 
social change of the women's movement' (MacKinnon 1982:519). 
 
Problems in Feminist Knowledge Production Today  
 
In order to understand the context we begin from, we will outline some of the problems of 
contemporary feminisms which necessitate a return to CR. The mass movement of the 1970s 
has not resurfaced, CR groups have withered, and many graduates of the movement are 
employed in academia or the media. We contend that, at the height of the movement in the 
1970s, knowledge defined as 'feminist' generally arose from the knowledge-production 
activities of women in CR groups, who were not defined as intellectual specialists. It was in 
this way that feminist theory could speak of the experience of women as a group. In contrast, 
feminist knowledge-production today is largely the preserve of specialist academics and 
media figures, who define what counts as feminist knowledge. Women who are not specialist 
knowledge-producers become objects of knowledge who are spoken 'about' and 'for', rather 
than contributing to knowledge-production. In the absence of a process such as CR, feminists 
seeking to articulate a gendered positionality can derive one in three ways: firstly, by 
defaulting back to the traditional model of a vanguard intellectual or political leader, whose 
own analysis integrates otherwise disparate perspectives; secondly, by accepting and arguing 
from the common-sense perspectives of conventional social subjects, thus reproducing their 
conservative assumptions; or thirdly, by relying on past processes of subject-formation (most 
often, the conclusions of the 1970s CR process itself), deployed outside its context, with the 
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theorist exclusively responsible for updating or modifying this knowledge to the current 
neoliberal context.  
 
Some theorists argue that the function of CR has not disappeared through this process, but 
been transformed. It is argued that television shows which incorporate feminist themes now 
perform the role of CR groups, or the function of CR groups has devolved onto publications 
such as magazines and novels (Sowards and Renegar, 2004; Campbell, 2002:58). It is also 
argued that the process is displaced into Women's Studies programmes in universities (see 
Boxer, 1982). However, the difference between these alternatives and classical CR is that the 
communicative relationship is hierarchical. As Levine (n.d.:6) argues, such experiences may 
raise awareness, but are unlikely to create collective consciousness or encourage action. The 
movement of feminism towards academia is criticised for rendering feminism subject mainly 
to academic standards, rather than women's experiences (Suleri, 1992). This problem partly 
reflects a wider difficulty with communication. People, including women, are densely 
connected today, for example through business networks and social media, but mostly 
through alienating forms of semi-coerced, performative connectedness (Lazzarato, 1996; 
Berardi, 2009:108, 112) in which self-censorship and insincere expression are common. 
Whereas Fordist subjects could easily see themselves as oppressed once they found their 
voice, today's subjects increasingly articulate mainstream standards in their own voices, as 
part of the dominant subjective performativity (Amsler, 2011). In our own case, the 
knowledge-production contained in this paper is not an alternative grassroots approach, but 
points to the importance of such an approach by drawing on the voices of CR group 
participants. We are a junior academic and an independent researcher, both with connections 
to social movements. Our contribution is intended to encourage academic feminists to move 
towards a revival of grassroots knowledge-production to provide a theoretical base for 
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feminism and other radical theories. It is similar to MacKinnon's (1982) call for feminism to 
be a grounded theory rooted in the experiences of women. 
 
Current theoretical approaches in feminism reflect difficulties resulting from an absence of 
grassroots knowledge-production (i.e. by 'ordinary' or subaltern social actors themselves, 
without an intellectual or political leadership providing the bridge between everyday 
experience and theoretical knowledge). Of the three approaches discussed above, the third – 
deriving a general body of theory from second-wave feminism, and articulating and updating 
it oneself – is the most common strategy adopted by feminists in academia. This is the case, 
for instance, in feminist International Relations (IR) theory, which generally deploys insights 
from the 1970s to criticise masculine structures of international power (e.g. Cohn, 1993; 
Tickner, 1988; Enloe, 1990). The resultant critiques are powerful, but leave epistemological 
power in the hands of the theorist, albeit based on the results of earlier social movements. An 
alternative path is provided by autobiographical and autoethnographic forms of feminism, but 
these similarly leave the theorist in the position of epistemological power by focusing on the 
theorist's own experiences and narratives. The danger in this case is both vanguardism (only 
the properly qualified theorist can write a recognised autobiography) and common-sense (the 
narrative of a subject is untouchable, even though it embeds dominant social assumptions). 
For example, when Griffin positions 'anger as a productive force' through autobiography and 
situates her anger in relation to structural racism and sexism (2012:138), she is articulating a 
similar process to CR groups. However, the autobiographical approach presents the point of 
view of a single subject. In addition, autobiography is tied-up with personal accountability in 
a public written sphere (Swindell, 1995:9), playing into a management of subjectivity which 
undermines participatory experience and knowledge (Heshusius, 1994). While some 
feminists argue that female autobiographies avoid such problems, this seems to rely on a 
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loaded selection of examples (Stanley, 1990:58) and elision of complexity (Stanley, 1993). 
The author is typically a relatively privileged academic and longstanding feminist, whose 
voice effectively stands for, but cannot directly articulate, the perspectives of women more 
broadly. This is particularly exposed by Reynolds' (2002) critique of black feminism, based 
on sociological research into black women's self-perceptions. Reynolds' research reveals 
sharp discontinuities between what is described as black female experience in academic 
accounts and literary texts, and what is suggested in everyday discourse. Her research shows 
that black feminist theory, at an academic level, is disconnected from the lives of black 
women outside academia. This situation has arguably arisen because of the prevalence of 
autobiographical accounts in academic feminism, with the feminist academic's personal 
conscience, or the group norms of similar academics, providing the test for knowledge-
claims, separate from wider contexts.  
 
Reynolds' critique relies on a third approach which provides a means to access perspectives 
wider than the author's: the use of social-scientific research methods to access the 
perspectives of actually-existing women, a process which combines a vanguard researcher 
role with a perspective articulated from existing beliefs. In these cases, the integration of 
experiences occurs, but is exclusively the work of the feminist academic who performs the 
integration of interview results. The conclusion is typically reached that women perform 
gender in different ways, and/or that many women hold anti-feminist positions. A conscious, 
non-submerged position never emerges, or else is simply claimed by the interviewer from a 
vanguard position.  
 
For example, Luttrell (1989) studies black and white working-class women's 'ways of 
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knowing' using traditional qualitative methods of interview and participant observation. Her 
conclusion is that these women value 'common sense' or 'streetwise' knowledge over school 
knowledge, and they misrecognise this knowledge as instinctive, rather than learnt. They 
believe, for instance, that working-class women have instinctive ways of making do, and of 
caring for children. They also treat their own knowledge as subordinate to male and educated 
types of knowledge. These findings are unsurprising. We do not question either Luttrell's 
method or her conclusions, but the political consequences are twofold. Firstly, Luttrell is only 
able to draw feminist conclusions because she distances her own position from that of her 
respondents; otherwise, she would be required to accept both women's inferiority and the 
instinctual nature of knowledge. Secondly, the process of knowledge-formation which 
analyses and shows the fallacies in working-class women's knowledge in this outer way is 
apparently ineffectual in transforming such knowledge. Knowledge-construction remains the 
privilege of the scholar. 
 
The absence of grassroots knowledge-production is a noticeable gap in all three types of 
academic feminism. None of the three approaches actually articulates a 'women's 
perspective', constructed from the standpoint of women as a group or particularity, because 
each relies on an epistemically privileged, vanguard standpoint for its construction of what 
women's experience 'means'. All three positions are torn between the alternatives of retaining 
radicalism at the expense of vanguardism, or reflecting popular views at the expense of de-
radicalisation. The absence of grassroots knowledge-production makes it impossible to 
simultaneously avoid both vanguardism and recourse to (neoliberal) common sense when 
constructing knowledge of positionalities. There is thus a political need to return to bottom-
up knowledge-production processes similar to those used in 1970s CR. We wish to emphasise 
that we are not saying qualitative research, autobiography, or feminist IR theory are 
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undesirable. Important discoveries and structural effects – particularly in opening up issues 
within academia – have been achieved through them. However, we believe these approaches 
insufficient to create situated, horizontal, non-vanguardist feminisms in political practice, 
because these approaches reproduce a hierarchical relationship between a scholar who knows 
and is able to speak, and a wider community of women who are spoken about, or spoken to.  
 
The structuring role of the hypothesis in CR groups  
This section aims to analyse how CR works as an affective and social process. Drawing on 
academic studies and participant accounts of the process, and emphasizing the testimonies of 
politicization of the participants in the 1970s process, we attempt to reconstruct the 
mechanisms through which participants’ subjectivities and narratives are both expressed and 
transformed within CR groups. CR was a 'conscious attempt to speak in words born of 
grassroots insight, including the resulting passion and anger' (Hanisch, 2010). The process of 
structural integration of experiences occurs, but without need for vanguard intellectuals to 
perform this role. Sessions would thus involve two modalities of being together; first a 
convivial mode whereby women would speak from personal experience, recounting 
experiences and their emotions surrounding these, and a second mode where these 
experiences would be understood through a lens of ‘structural causality’; that is in relation to 
the hypothesis that seemingly ‘personal’ experiences and emotions had political causes 
situated in structures of oppression. The role of the hypothesis of structural causality which 
underpins the second half of CR sessions, provides a means to connect personal experience 
into the wider spatio-temporal field of social structures and ecology (c.f. Wallerstein, 
1988:291). It situates experience in a longer duration of structural time than usually arises in 
spontaneous everyday discourse, that is, a type of temporality which is connected to large-
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scale geohistorical space. Feminist theory examines this space mainly in terms of patriarchy 
as a persistent system. In doing so, it inserts gender into a temporal field which is otherwise 
largely monopolised by masculine conceptions. In line with Marxist theorists such as 
Wallerstein and Gramsci, we would suggest ‘structural TimeSpace’ - the enduring 
continuities and patterns that change slowly (Wallerstein 1988:291) - is generally invisible to 
everyday experience or common sense. Social actors operating on an everyday level tend to 
neglect structural TimeSpace. CR rectifies this problem by connecting structural analysis 
directly to experience. While based in personal experience, CR also assumed that feminism 
requires political analyses (Rogers 2010:3). In CR, structuring claims that 'the personal is 
political' and that personal experiences are often structural effects made structural TimeSpace 
visible, in contrast to interpretations focused on the ‘episodic TimeSpace’ (Wallerstein 
1988:290) of individual lives, which reproduces categories used in everyday life, or the 
‘eternal TimeSpace’ (Wallerstein 1988:294) of naturalised gender roles.  
 
Crucially, this entailed assuming women did not already know their own positionality, but 
unlike other theories that assume some form of ‘false consciousness’, the process of CR does 
not require vanguard knowledge to liberate submerged subjects. It was assumed that women’s 
perceptions are ‘cramped, darkened, frustrated, undeveloped, misguided or even seemingly 
replaced by a false consciousness’ (Forer, 1975:151). As such, women’s ability to perceive 
the structural nature of their oppression was blocked, individualized and personalized, with 
women tending to blame themselves or their unique situation. The addition of the structural 
hypothesis and the activity of sharing experiences revealed experiential commonalities, and 
feelings such as anger, frustration, boredom and unhappiness were saying something political 
(Hole and Levine, 1971:131; Brownmiller 1970:146; Allen 1970:28). Through the grassroots 
process of discovering that the personal is also political, participants were able to re-inscribe 
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and transform the dominant meaning of experience therefore overcoming the 
individualization and personalization of oppression (Bruley 1976:22; Bond and Lieberman, 
1980 268). This involved a process of relating formerly personalised problems such as 
individual malaise to sexism and other structural causes, so the problems appear as a political 
pattern rather than individual dysfunction (Shreve, 1989:59; Dreifus, 1973:5; Bruley, 
1976:21). Group organisers might already accept the truth of the structuring hypothesis, but 
participants typically entered the process in a more ambivalent stance. The ‘hypothesis’ is 
therefore a claim (structural oppression generates experience) initially proposed as a ‘what 
if…’ and has a structuring function within the groups on how the various personal 
experiences are combined and processed in the CR group setting. CR is thus not purely a 
matter of subjective positionality: ‘We believe that theory and analysis which are not rooted 
in concrete experience (practice) are useless, but we also maintain that for the concrete, 
everyday experiences to be understood, they must be subjected to the process of analysis and 
abstraction’ (Allen 1970:273).  
 
The main transformative effect of CR was the challenge posed to the existing, 'common 
sense' narratives through which women previously interpreted their experiences. CR therefore 
initiated a process of unlearning dominant thought patterns, or decolonizing patriarchal 
beliefs, beginning from women’s concrete experiences. While CR did not simply leave 
existing narratives unchanged, it validated the reality of otherwise disavowed experiences of 
oppression, creating a standpoint outside the dominant regime of concepts from which the 
unthinkable could be thought. In discovering that the ‘personal narrative is political’ 
participants ‘transform the dominant meaning of experience by bringing a different set of 
assumptions to bear on it’ (Langellier, 1989:269). It changed the criteria of verification, from 
criteria limited by the categories of structural patriarchy to criteria focused on one's own 
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experience (MacKinnon, 1989:87). By assessing experiences from their embodied and 
affective significance for oneself – rather than their meaning within patriarchal structures, or 
for dominant others (in this case, men) – CR suspended patriarchal representational power 
and enabled alternative perceptions. This led to the creation of a 'crystal of time' (Deleuze, 
1989:68-97) in which episodic and structural temporal perceptions coexist, in a setting 
encouraging to the selection of the latter. 
 
Constructing a safe space 
Some accounts of temporal transformation emphasise the need for a process of slowing-down 
in order to combat the system's predeliction for speed (Virilio, 1990:89). Separation is a 
particular effect of homogeneous empty time and neoliberal social space which fragment 
experiences and atomize individuals, and coming together in the face of social fragmentation 
is already an act of resistance (Bey, 1994). The spatial aspects of CR were particularly geared 
to this temporal effect. In addition to being a procedure for producing knowledge, CR was 
also a type of group formation. The organizational mode was necessarily small, formally non-
hierarchical groups. (Whether they were also able to eliminate informal hierarchies is 
debated, though attempts were made to do so). CR aimed to end women’s sense of isolation, 
thus enabling them to feel less alienated from one another, finding ‘human contact with other 
women’ (Allen 1970:273), fostering ‘a feeling of intimacy and trust’ (Ibid:273). This required 
a high level of commitment: in particular time commitments and also commitments to 
speaking and acting honestly, openly and with respect and non-judgment (Rogers 2010:18). 
 
Similarly to anarchism (Day, 2005:9), CR relied on an immanentist approach to social 
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change, meaning that it did not assume the inevitability of contradiction between means and 
ends. It aimed to move away from vanguard knowledge and theory and activism produced on 
behalf of others: ‘We felt that all women would have to see the fight of women as their own, 
not as something just to help “other women”’ (Sarachild 1975:145). It was a ‘conscious 
attempt to speak in words born of grassroots insight, including the resulting passion and 
anger’ (Hanish, 2010). Finding an autonomous voice based on authentic desires was a 
difficult and time-consuming process as it required recognizing and overcoming existing 
habits of superficial communication (Bruley, 1976:8). This aspect of CR is based on the 
premise that women ‘had been glued to our men and separated from each other all our lives’ 
(Arnold 1970:160). CR enables women to form direct bonds, without the mediation of men 
(Bruley 1976:21), whilst problematising and overcoming feelings of hatred for the self and 
other women that are socialized through patriarchal culture (Allen 1970:11).  
 
The affective process was also slower and more spontaneous. Participants write of allowing 
themselves to be moved to speech, rather than succumbing to a pressure to communicate 
(Griffin, 1978:197), encouraging compassion and expressiveness (Reger, 2004:212). It is 
described as breaking down emotional alienation (Allen, 1970:24). Crucially, emotions were 
expressed, not programmed in the groups (Brownmiller, 1970:152). The slower pace of the 
process, compared with other forms of politics and everyday life, was seen to facilitate 
community-building and analytical integration: ‘We do not rush speech. We allow ourselves 
to be moved’ (Griffin, 1978:197). Each participant would be encouraged to take as much 
‘free space’ as she needed to talk, and interruption was discouraged. Less vocal members 
would be encouraged to participate in depth (Shreve 1989:21). Reger argues such free spaces 
were intentionally ‘infused with feminized emotion cultures fostering emotional 
expressiveness and caring, nurturing and personal relationships’ (Reger 2001:212). They 
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provided a safety net and vantage point outside everyday life (Shreve, 1989:199; Allen, 
1970:20-1).  
 
The emotional weaving of narratives 
While the temporal duration of CR included long-term structural temporality, in a concrete 
sense it operated more closely within a specifically female-gendered TimeSpace of cyclical 
reproduction. Cyclical TimeSpace encompasses the rhythms of functioning within structural 
TimeSpace, the enduring continuities and patterns that change slowly (Wallerstein 1988:291). 
While such reproduction is often associated with the subordination of women (Kristeva, 
1983), it has also been theorised as the level at which ideological identities are reproduced 
(Wallerstein, 1988:293; Lefebvre, 2014). Reproduction also underpins production as a deeper 
subaltern layer (Mies, 1999). CR challenges dominant framings of cyclical TimeSpace as 
naturalised repetition, but also uses cyclical TimeSpace through the modality of the 'kernel 
story'. The process reforms social existential territories by drawing emotional connections 
between personal narratives from an autonomous standpoint, rendering these narratives as 
cyclical repetitions of similar, comprehensible patterns. Levine (n.d.) argues that those who 
see CR as simply a precursor to large formal organizations or vanguardist politics are missing 
the point. Small groups offer an alternative approach to the reorganization of social and 
political life that rearticulates personal experiences into social connections, allowing 
participants to conceptualise 'where we are in light of where we are not yet' (Bartky, 
1977:26). This creates an alternative worldview, an 'ideology' (Allen, 1970:8) or 'theoretical 
horizon' (Malo, 2004) to an extent autonomous or ‘outside’ patriarchy. 
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As part of CR, the 'kernel story' was a key means through which cyclical time - a style of 
constructing time on the basis of recurrence, repetition and circular return - was 
reconstructed. Kalcik highlights the specific modes of speech and narrative that took place 
within groups, which reinforced the aims of linking experience to structures, following an 
aesthetic principle of harmonizing the accounts (Kalcik, 1975:6). Studies of the speech and 
rhetoric styles of the groups have constructed the idea of a ‘kernel story’, involving brief 
references to core themes in previous accounts, which allowed the weaving together of 
experiences (Kalcik, 1995:3,9; Shreve 1989:21; Campbell, 2002:51). Kernel stories meant 
similar meanings could be attributed to experiences with reference to the core hypothesis of 
structural patriarchy, without reducing the differences between experiences (Dubriwny, 
2005:406, 417; Allen 1070:26). Bruley articulates the kernel story as a kind of ‘shorthand’ 
code that imbued the group with its own terminology, allowing rapid connections to previous 
discussions (Bruley 1976:8) which would lead to ‘collective development of experiential 
knowledge’ (Dubriwny 2005:395) involving a ‘collaborative interaction of many voices’ 
(Ibid:398). The kernel story offered a critique and alternative TimeSpace to ‘reproductive 
labour’, which refers to the largely unpaid labour which goes in to reproducing human labour 
power through childbirth, childcare, domestic and emotional work (Mies 1999: 31; Federici 
2012: 2). In place of the closed, external cycles of reproductive labour, which confine women 
to the endless repetition of housework routines that are never complete and must be repeated 
at regular intervals, CR constructs a cyclical repetition of meaningful experience through 
mutual reference. This creates a cyclical temporality internal to the group, linking cyclical 
repetition of stories to structural repetitions underlying life-conditions. 
 
Affective transformation and personal durée 
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In discussing the affective aspects of CR, we use the concept of a personal durée, which is 
derived from the work of Bergson (see Fujii, n.d.). For Bergson, each of us has a particular 
durée, or way of being in the field of time, with its own speed and points of connection. This 
field is suppressed in traditional, masculine political approaches, which tend to exclude 
emotions from the field of politics. In contrast, CR enabled emotional expression. Emotions 
which participants previously found it difficult to speak, which had no concomitant terms in 
language, often manifested as personal 'shittiness', were articulated (Levine, 1979:8; Milan 
Bookstore Collective, 1990:26). Anger in particular was given validation and outlets (Reger, 
2004:214; Bruley, 1976:13). Emotions such as anger, frustration, hopelessness and alienation 
are depersonalized and transformed into ‘a collectively defined sense of injustice’ (Reger, 
2004:205). Participants are therefore able to break out of the episodic TimeSpace of constant 
oppressive experiences, transforming the anger and frustration into ‘constructive energy’ 
(Levine 1979:6), turning emotions outwards towards dismantling patriarchal structures rather 
than turning them inwards (WMST-L, n.d.). 
 
Affirmative emotions were also constructed, such as feelings of closeness and intimacy 
(Dreifus 1973:52), trust (Allen 1970:59) and empowerment (Lee 2001:68) and a feeling of 
being ‘okay’ (Shreve 1989:240). The process is described as breaking down emotional 
alienation (Allen 1970:24). Emotional response therefore acts as the basis of politicization 
and both personal and political transformation. There is no knowing subject who tells 
participants what they are to become, but rather, a type of self-transformation through ‘the 
click’. This entails reconnecting with one's personal durée in a social context, accessing 
previously unconscious or repressed emotions which deviate from structural definitions of 
roles, thus mobilising personal durée as a transformative force against structural TimeSpace.  
21 
 
 
The transformative moment of the “click” 
The revolutionary moment of transformation is best associated with kairos, which we believe 
provides a model for revolutionary change in the present, linking theory to practice without 
the need for vanguard knowledge producers. The transformative TimeSpace of kairos, 
associated mainly with large-scale revolutionary processes by theorists such as Wallerstein 
(1988:295-6), Negri (2005) and Deleuze (2004:190), also retains a strong element of personal 
transformation, in which the spatio-temporal field is reconceived through a shift in the 
personal point of view. Kairos is transformative time, which is experienced as a time-lapse or 
a moment where everything is simultaneous, rather than as homogeneous empty time. It is the 
time of events, although this term should be taken to encompass small everyday 
transformations as well as large ruptural events on a social scale. Kairos can thus be theorised 
as less like a Badiousian Event (Badiou 2005) than like a series of small, but structurally 
transformative events within the lives of particular actors. In our previous work (Firth and 
Robinson, 2014), we suggested these forms of time entail selections at the level of desire 
between different insertions in the field of time, and reconstructions which break with the 
continuity of structural time so as to allow the creation of new temporalities. Walter Benjamin 
has a related concept of 'messianic' time, a type of monadic moment separated from the flow 
of history in which disalienated life is compressed (Benjamin, 1970 [1955]:263; Wolin, 
1994:58).  
 
If kairos is conceived as a transformation in alignment or perspective, a shift in the crystal of 
time between two series of images or a new 'roll of the dice' in Nietzschean terms, then kairos 
exists as a moment within the CR process. A particular kind of personal kairos is experienced 
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within CR in the form of the 'click' – the moment at which subjective alignments are 
reconfigured on the basis of the group process. Prior to this, participants’ lives were in 
turmoil, but few understood why (Shreve, 1989:40). Consciousness-raising, as described 
above, moved from personal experience towards developing a broader perspective of one’s 
own life from the vantage point of wider social conditions, drawn from dialogue with other 
participants’ experiences (Allen 1970:20-1), bridging politics and one’s own life (Bruley, 
1976:21; Allen 1970:15), or objectifying consciousness at a given time (Forer, 1975:151). 
This moment of achieving an autonomous epistemology is termed ‘the click’ (Reger 
2004:211; Allen 1970:27), described as ‘eye-popping realization’ of how patriarchy structures 
life experiences (Shreve, 1989:53). It differs from vanguardist knowledge produced by 
intellectuals or movement leaders because it is produced through a combination of one’s own 
experience and dialogue with the experiences of others, and occurs mainly affectively, rather 
than consciously. The reconstruction of affective autonomy is particularly important. The 
process is not a form of ideological vanguardism through which emotions are repressed and 
forced into new paths. Rather, emotions such as anger are chanelled expressively into a 
process of interacting creatively with the world, through actions to resist patriarchy and to re-
form autonomous subjectivities and communities, breaking down emotional alienation (Allen 
1970:24). The click is a quotidian form of kairos in which transformation is embedded in 
everyday practice. This is distinct from the view of kairos as a large social change, but it is 
our contention that major social transformations are actually accumulations of quotidian 
'clicks'. 
 
Conclusion 
This discussion has shown how the temporal aspects of CR enable it to avoid the dual traps of 
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vanguardism and common sense. CR was a mode of knowledge-production that aimed to 
provide an alternative to masculinist theories. In the current context, it can also be contrasted 
with theories produced by women but in vanguardist or alienated ways, and those which are 
based on the previous wave of CR. In general, CR was a process of horizontal knowledge-
creation. Through sharing particular truths and experiences, a shared epistemological position 
emerged which could be used to construct a common political position. A primary purpose of 
CR is to ‘develop ideology and learn to think autonomously’ (Allen 1070:8). CR transgresses 
dominant forms of homogeneous empty time, allowing the creation of cyclical continuities, 
the expression of personal durée, the exposure of invisible structural temporalities, and the 
emergence of kairos or transformative time. Without such a process, epistemologies remain 
trapped within the existing field and the possibilities available in episodic and repetitive time.  
 
Both the re-emerging feminist movement which is appearing today, and the range of other 
social movements emerging in the context of precarity, austerity and global war – such as 
decolonial and indigenous movements, anarchism and autonomism, and the emerging anti-
racist movement – need something similar to CR as a means of grassroots knowledge-
production, so as to avoid falling into the dual pitfalls. Constructing such a process is easier 
said than done, because it is impeded by the ways capitalism eats up people's time today 
(Bey, 1994), by the mediated forms of communication which reduce perceptions of its 
necessity, by the high-speed, temporary nature of most contemporary movements, and by the 
subjectivities engendered by neoliberalism. However, persistent personal problems provide a 
basis for re-establishing CR. 
 
To conclude, the history of CR shows the possibility for grassroots knowledge-production in 
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which general structural analysis emerges directly from social movement participants, 
without the need for an intellectual to play a mediating role. This is important in redressing 
current limits in academic and social movement feminism, which are over-reliant on general 
theoretical positions and claims about experience without a clear basis in grassroots 
reflection. This is important today to provide direction to the emerging feminist movement 
which connects it to the full range of women's experiences today. CR is a pedagogical process 
in that it entails the transformation of subjectivities and perspectives, though it is clearly not a 
top-down or didactic pedagogy which reproduces pre-formed positions. Rather, it is a form of 
immanent learning in which participants play a central role in constructing what is learnt. 
This is important today, in order to strengthen the creation of knowledge within social 
movements, rather than exclusively in academia. 
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